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A Rand Corporation analyst came to the Pentagon and suggested that Saudi Arabia is an enemy of the U.S., the Washington Post reported Tuesday. The article points out that this is not the government’s policy or view, but rather an independent analyst’s perspective; it also suggests that this perspective has growing currency within the Bush administration.

I heard Defense Secretary Rumsfeld fulminating on NPR’s top-of-the-hour news about this Pentagon leak. “Unprofessional,” he fumed. It did not represent the government’s point of view. It was obviously “leaked by someone who wants to feel important.” The leaker, he concluded, should go to jail.

This is the Bush administration’s reflex every time there’s a leak exposing a policy rift: Which traitor broke ranks?

Isn’t it time Rumsfeld and his colleagues grew up and admitted that leaks like this happen only when there is genuine disagreement among policymakers, and one of them, vying for position, chooses to send up a flare in the press? (I’m not subscribing here to the darker conspiracy-theory view that these leaks are in fact orchestrated by the administration even as it disavows them. That can happen, but I don’t think it happens often, and I don’t think it’s happening now.)

Rumsfeld may not like that way of doing business. It is arguably not a good way of doing business. But it’s not about “wanting to feel important.” There’s a real issue at stake here: How do we deal with the fact that Saudi Arabia’s government is both an ally and in many ways a backer of the radical Islamism that we find ourselves fighting?

Since we’re nominally “at war” and American lives are actually and potentially at stake, those policy conflicts ought to be debated in full public view, not left purely to the “professionals.” Instead, the Bush administration’s first resort is to demand that leakers go to jail.

Which former Republican administration does that remind you of? Right — one that ended in resignation and disgrace. Rumsfeld knows all about the Nixon crew’s way of dealing with leaks, of course; he got his start in politics with them.

There’s an interesting debate going on among Glenn Reynolds, Nick Denton and Dave Winer about the following proposition: “the US needs to destroy Saddam Hussein’s regime mainly because the West needs to humiliate the Arab world, and dispel the Islamic millenial fantasy.”
Doc Searls has the full recap, and a perspective that I find persuasive. …And as Farhad points out in the comments, taking Saddam out doesn’t achieve the goal of humiliating Islamism because Saddam isn’t an Islamist: “If we wanted to crush Islamism, we’d crush Saudi Arabia, not Iraq.”

History never moves as neatly as first reports suggest. After 9/11, conventional wisdom coalesced around the notion that the Clinton administration had botched its response to Osama bin Laden’s terror threat in its 1998 missile attack on bin Laden’s Khost training camp, a response to U.S. embassy bombings in Africa. If only Clinton had done a better job of retaliating then, the thinking was, maybe we wouldn’t have faced the disaster of the al-Qaida attacks.

But a fascinating in-depth report in Time suggests that responsibility for the failure to act against al-Qaida ought to be at least equally shared with — if not mostly borne by — the Bush administration. It seems that the Clinton national security team handed its Bush-named successors detailed plans to dismember al-Qaida in Jan. 2001. But the proposals “became a victim of the transition process, turf wars and time spent on the pet policies of new top officials.” Read and weep. (Joe Conason offers more detailed comment here.)

Meanwhile, Friday’s Wall Street Journal offered a piece about the state of al-Qaida’s relationship with the Taliban through the late ’90s that challenges our view of events from a different direction. The Journal, which last year lucked upon a laptop computer filled with al-Qaida files that it has been mining for stories ever since, reports that, from the time of bin-Laden’s arrival in Afghanistan through 1998, the al-Qaida Arabs and the Taliban Afghans disliked and distrusted each other: bin Laden’s people looked down their noses at the Taliban hicks, and Mullah Omar’s people thought bin Laden was a publicity-hungry grandstander abusing their hospitality. On the eve of the Khost attack, in fact, the Taliban seem to have been preparing to evict bin Laden’s gang. Once the U.S. missiles landed, however, bin Laden became a folk hero — the Islamic leader who’d stood up to the Americans — and the Afghan-Arab alliance was fortified.

Does this mean Clinton goofed by not hitting al-Qaida harder? On one level, sure, that’s obvious. But “hitting harder” without actually killing bin Laden would probably not have made a difference in the long run to 9/11. Unless one of those cruise missiles lobbed at Afghanistan had actually taken bin Laden out — or unless the U.S. had geared up for a much more extensive assault on bin Laden’s entire organization, which in those Monica-mad times would have been viewed as a gigantic “Wag the Dog” exercise — it’s hard to see how anything would have changed.

In response to this weekend’s suicide bombing in Israel — ostensibly a retaliation for the Israeli army’s missile attack that killed a Hamas leader and nine children, and the latest bloody act in a cycle of violence with no exit in sight — President Bush had this to say: “There are a few killers who want to stop the peace process that we have started, and we must not let them.”

Now, if the problem were “a few killers,” the solution would be simple, and it would be Ariel Sharon’s solution: Peace would be a straightforward matter of, in Bushanese, smoking ’em out and hunting ’em down. But Sharon and the Israeli army have been doing that for months now, and for all their effort, the bombings continue.

Perhaps at one time Israel was at war with a handful of militants, but it seems increasingly plain that what the Israelis now face is a mass movement, radicalized by years of privation, hopelessness, bad leadership and propaganda. Any plan to end the bombings and move towards peace that fails to take this reality into account seems doomed to me.

More valuable than most conventional journalism on this subject, I think, was this weekend’s heartbreaking reporting on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict on NPR’s This American Life (Available soon at the show’s Web site).

While we are still digesting the unsurprising but still flabbergasting report about the Bush campaign’s use of Enron and Halliburton corporate jets during the Florida recount fracas, Al Gore comes out punching — finally — in a Times op-ed today. Looks like Gore is mad about comments from Joe Lieberman and others that he was wrong to play the populist card in 2000. My only question is what took the once and presumably future candidate so long to enter the fray. Meanwhile, Democratic National Committee spokesman Bill Buck wins the soundbite prize: “The Bush-Cheney administration literally flew into power in Enron’s and Halliburton’s corporate jets.”